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THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 22, No. 4
operate a business for buying, selling, and trading new and used farm
equipment, Darnall v. City of Monticello,9 where testimony relating to
potential decrease in property values from an appraiser and neighbors
was justification for denial of a conditional use permit to build a duplex
on property zoned for single-family homes, and Steen, where neighbor-
hood opposition to an application for a conditional use permit to use ten
acres of property as a borrow pit was upheld.
There is only one lesson to be learned in this area: what is competent
evidence in one state probably will not be competent evidence in the
next state.
IV. First Amendment and Land Use"
Once again in the past year, the U.S. Supreme Court has entered an
opinion involving the first amendment that has significant ramifications
for local zoning and planning. This marks the third time since 1986 that
the Court has handed down a decision in this field. 96 The most important
development in this area of the law since last year's committee report is
the Supreme Court's decision in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,97 which
addressed the validity of a comprehensive adult entertainment zoning
and licensing ordinance enacted by Dallas in 1986. FW/PBS was fol-
lowed with great interest because it marked the first time the Court had
considered the validity of using a restrictive licensing scheme to regu-
late adult entertainment businesses.98
The first amendment is also increasingly important in the field of his-
toric preservation law, where local preservation commissions are now
frequently encountering resistance from religious groups when they
designate historic churches, or deny permits to alter or demolish them.
In two cases decided this past year in New York and Boston, churches
claimed that landmark designation interfered with the free exercise of
94. 522 N.E.2d 837 (MII. App. 4 Dist. 1988).
95. This section is taken from the report of the First Amendment and Land Use Law
Subcommittee, co-chaired by Professors Alan Weinstein, Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law, and Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., University of Denver School of Law. Professor
Weinstein submitted this year's report. Bradford J. White, of Clarion Associates, Inc.
in Chicago, and Co-Chair of the Historic Preservation and Architectural Controls Sub-
committee, submitted the portions of this section dealing with the first amendment and
historic preservation.
96. The other two cases were Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986),
and City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 108 S. Ct. 2138
(1988).
97. __ U.S. -, l10 S. Ct. 596 (1990).
98. In previous cases, the Court upheld zoning restrictions that regulated the loca-
tion of adult businesses in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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religion, testing the traditionally zoning and land-use notions about reg-
ulation of the location, use, and occupancy of church structures.
A. Restrictive Licensing of
Adult Entertainment Businesses
The Dallas ordinance in question in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas
comprehensively regulated "sexually oriented businesses."99 In addi-
tion the ordinances required that adult businesses be licensed, with civil
disability provisions prohibiting certain individuals from obtaining li-
censes. The ordinance imposed locational restrictions on adult busi-
nesses, required that viewing booths in adult theatres be configured to
allow surveillance by management, and prohibited the rental of a motel
room for less than ten hours at a time.'°°
The bulk of the ordinance was upheld in the district court, '° ' but the
Fifth Circuit panel, while affirming the lower court's decision, split on
the most critical aspect of the Dallas scheme, whether its licensing pro-
visions should be treated as a form of content-neutral "time, place and
manner" regulation because they were aimed at controlling the "sec-
ondary effects" created by adult businesses rather than expressive ac-
tivity itself. ,2 Finding that the Dallas ordinance regulated the secondary
effects of adult businesses, two members of the panel argued that it was
unnecessary for Dallas to comply with the more stringent procedural
safeguards that are applied to regulations aimed at content and held that
the lower level of protection provided by the "time, place and manner"
analysis in the Supreme Court's Rentonl 3 decision was adequate. 'oAf-
99. The ordinance defines a "sexually oriented business" as an "adult" arcade,
bookstore, video stores, cabaret, motel, motion picture theatre, theatre, escort agency,
nude model studio or sexual encounter center. 110 S. Ct. at 602.
100. See Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D.Tex. 1986).
101. See 110 S. Ct. at 602. The district court for various reasons, struck several pro-
visions of the ordinance. See Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061.
102. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988).
103. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the court es-
tablished that municipalities could single-out adult businesses for special regulatory
treatment in the form of time, place, and manner regulations that restricted the locations
where such businesses could operate, so long as the municipality could show it had a
substantial governmental interest in regulating such businesses and the regulations still
allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.
104. FW/PBS, 837 F.2d at 1302-03. The Fifth Circuit majority did note that applica-
tion of the Renton analysis does not inevitably exclude the use of greater procedural
safeguards. They argued that theses procedures were not necessary in this case, how-
ever, because a business that was denied a license would presumably have enough at
stake to warrant seeking judicial review of the licensing decision, and thus, while there
might not be immediate review of a decision that could restrain free expression, there
would be no permanent suppression of speech based solely on the discretion of a city
official.
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ter acknowledging that it would be "awkward" to analyze some of the
Dallas licensing provisions as "time, place and manner" restrictions
within the Renton framework, the majority of the Fifth Circuit panel
found the licensing scheme valid in all respects.'05
The dissenting judge strongly disagreed with this position, arguing
that licensing schemes could not be analyzed like zoning restrictions be-
cause the denial of a license effected a complete ban on speech and thus
raised serious prior restraint problems that are not properly addressed in
the Renton standards.' Further, because the Dallas ordinance's licens-
ing provisions failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards before
imposing a prior restraint on speech, as required by Freedman v. Mary-
land,'o7 the ordinance was invalid.
Although the Supreme Court adopted this position by a 6-3 vote and
struck down the licensing provisions of the Dallas ordinance, 08 safe-
guards stated in Freedman case should be required. Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, argued that only two of the
three Freedman safeguards were required: (1) that any restraint im-
posed prior to judicial review be only for a specified brief period dur-
ing which the status quo must be maintained and (2) prompt judicial
review of that restraint must be available.'°9 Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, argued that the third standard, re-
quiring the "censor" to bear the burden of going to court and the bur-
den of proof in court in order to obtain a final restraint, was also neces-
sary."0
Justice O'Connor gave two reasons why the third standard was not
required in this case. First, as opposed to the Freedman case which in-
volved censorship of individual motion pictures, the Dallas licensing
scheme does not involve passing judgment on the content of particular
films or books. Instead, the city makes a ministerial decision about each
applicant based on a set of defined criteria and thus ". . . the city does
not exercise discretion by passing judgment on the content of any pro-
105. Id. at 1304. The majority correctly recognized that the "awkwardness" was
caused by the differing effects of denying someone an adult business license because of
zoning (i.e., locational) factors, which could be cured by selecting a different location,
and a denial based on such immutable personal characteristics as a record of convictions
for certain crimes. In the former case, one's freedom of expression is merely regulated,
while in the latter it is prohibited entirely.
106. 837 F.2d at 1306-12.
107. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
108. The Court found that the Dallas licensing scheme did not place any time limits
on the various inspections required before a license could be issued, thus allowing an
indefinite postponement of the issuance of a license.
109. 110 S. Ct. at 603-07.
110. Id. at611-13.
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tected speech.""' Second, O'Connor argued that Freedman placed the
burden of going to court, and the burden of proof in court, on the censor
because where exhibition of a single film was at issue, it was unlikely
that a motion picture distributor would have enough at stake to warrant
challenging the censor's decision and thus the decision to suppress
would itself guarantee complete suppression of the speech. In the Dallas
case, however, involving business licensing, the license applicants
would have enough at stake to pursue a license denial through the
courts. 112
The three dissenting Justices would have affirmed the Fifth Circuit
and held the licensing scheme valid. Justice White, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, argued that the Renton standards were sufficient to safe-
guard the licensees' rights under the first amendment and that there was
no evidence in the record of the licensing delays that Justice O'Connor
cited as the reason for requiring application of Freedman's procedural
requirements. 113 Thus, Justice White could "see no basis for invalidat-
ing measures that will guard against highly speculative injuries." ,"
Justice Scalia would have upheld the ordinance on the novel theory
that adult businesses which specialize in "hard-core" pornography or
live nude performances deserve no first amendment protection because
they are engaged in "the sordid business of pandering. "",5 In Scalia's
view, while individual works of pornography are always protected by
the first amendment, businesses that specialize in pornography that is
sexually explicit in more than a minor degree are engaged in an activity
that is akin to obscenity and are not constitutionally protected. 116
In generating four separate opinions on the critical issue of the valid-
ity of the licensing scheme,' the court follows its recent pattern of fail-
ing to reach a consensus the first time it considers a new issue involving
municipal regulation of expressive activity. If the Court follows true to
111. Id. at 607.
112. Id. at 606-07. This was essentially the same reasoning used by the majority of
the Fifth Circuit panel.
113. Id. at 614-17.
114. Id. at 616.
115. Id. at 617-25.
116. Justice Scalia cites Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), as authority
for his position. Justice Stevens, in his opinion, took issue with this, contending that
Ginzburg, which was decided before the Court extended first amendment protection to
commercial speech, "cannot withstand our decision in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)." Id. at 617.
117. Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Kennedy would require the ordinance to pro-
vide the first two procedural safeguards in Freedman; Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun would require all three; Justice White and the Chief Justice would let the
ordinance stand based on a novel approach to adult business regulation by declaring that
certain sexually explicitly adult businesses have no constitutional protection at all.
HeinOnline  -- 22 Urb. Law. 743 1990
THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 22, No. 4
form, it will take one or two more cases before a majority agrees on a
single approach. Thus, for example the Court split 4-1-4 in its first
"adult zoning" case, Young v. American Mini-Theatres,1 8 but was able
to form a six vote majority ten years later in Renton. Similarly, the
Court's five separate opinions in its 1981 sign regulation decision, Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,"9 coalesced into a six member ma-
jority three years later in the next sign case, Members of the City Council
of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent.2'
The Court had far less difficulty with the nonlicensing portions of the
Dallas ordinance. The entire Court agreed that Dallas could subject mo-
tels renting rooms for less than ten hours to regulation under the adult
business ordinance and only Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's
judgment that no petitioner could show standing to challenge the civil
disability provisions of the ordinance. '
2
FW/PBS has made clear that a majority of the Court views adult busi-
ness licensing provisions that have the potential to bar expressive activ-
ity differently from the locational restrictions approved in Young and
Renton. In this, the majority echoes the Court's 1981 ruling in Schad v.
Borough of Mt. Ephraim,2 2 striking down an ordinance, purportedly
aimed at adult businesses, that has the effect of banning all live enter-
tainment in a municipality. Further, since there was no single majority,
nor even a plurality, opinion on the issue of the procedural safeguards
required to enable an adult business licensing scheme to pass constitu-
tional muster, Dallas, or any other city, would be well-advised to pro-
vide all three of the Freedman safeguards in its licensing scheme it if
wants to avoid further constitutional challenges. Finally, the Court de-
ferred ruling on the civil disability provisions of the Dallas ordinance,
and vacated the Fifth Circuit's ruling on the issue but has for the first
time sanctioned regulating "adult motels."
118. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The case involved the Detroit "anti-skid-row" ordinance
that imposed a dispersion requirement on adult businesses. Justice Stevens' opinion up-
holding the ordinance was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell,
and Rehnquist, but lost Justice Powell, who wrote a separate concurring opinion, on the
issue of whether the ordinance was content-neutral. Justice Blackmun, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart dissented.
119. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). No more than four Justices could agree on any one view of
the case. In addition to the plurality opinion upholding the ordinance by Justice White,
joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stewart, there was a concurring opinion by
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, and separate dissenting opinions by Jus-
tices Stevens and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger.
120. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
121. The Court thus affirmed the Fifth Circuit regarding the "adult motel" portion
of the ordinance, reversed on the validity of the licensing scheme, and vacated that por-
tion of the Fifth Circuit opinion that upheld the civil disability provision.
122. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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B. The First Amendment, Churches and
Historic Preservation
The relationship between the first amendment and local land-use con-
trols has also been one of the pre-eminent historic preservation issues in
the past few years. The power of government to designate and regulate
churches and synagogues was challenged in The Society of Jesus in New
England v. Boston Landmarks Comm 'n, "'23 and Rector, Wardens and
Members of Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York.' 24
In the St. Bartholomew's case, a long-awaited decision, a federal dis-
trict court in New York City ruled that the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Commission action in denying a demolition permit for St.
Bartholomew's community house located on Park Avenue was not un-
constitutional under the first, fifth or fourteenth amendments. This
seems to follow a recent line of cases indicating that government can
carefully regulate religious institutions without violating the establish-
ment clause and the free exercise clause of the first amendment. How-
ever, the contrary result was reached in a trial level decision in New
England in the Society of Jesus case involving designation and protec-
tion of the interior of a Boston church.
In The Society ofJesus case, a Massachusetts Superior Court held that
the interior landmark designation of the Church of the Immaculate Con-
ception by the Boston Landmarks Commission acted as an impermissi-
ble burden on the Society of Jesus in New England's (the Jesuits) free
exercise of religion. The court found that the state interest in historic
preservation did not outweigh the significant restraints on the practice
of religion that were imposed by the city's landmark statute. 1
25
In October 1986, the Jesuits demolished several significant interior
features of the church without obtaining a building permit. The Jesuits
had planned a major renovation of the church to install office space and
to construct condominium units on its adjacent property. In October
1986, the Boston Landmarks Commission approved temporary land-
marks status for the building and ultimately designated a portion of the
interior of the church as a landmark in May 1987.
The Jesuits alleged that the mere designation of the church as a land-
mark violated their constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of reli-
gion. The court held that the Boston Landmarks Ordinance did not, on
its face, violate the first amendment; however, the court held that as
123. 728 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mass. 1989).
124. No. 86 Civ. 2848 (JES) (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, decided December 13, 1989).
125. Slip op. at 7-8.
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applied in this case, the designation of the church as a landmark violated
the Jesuits' free exercise of religion. 26 The court concluded that the des-
ignation itself placed constraints on the Jesuits' administration of their
church and that designation must be removed.
The court contrasted this case with the New York Court of Appeals
decision in Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick,127 where the
New York court held that the Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew's first
amendment challenge of the New York City Landmarks Preservation
Commission's designation as a taking of its property and infringement
of its first amendment rights was not ripe for review because the church
had not yet applied for a certificate of appropriateness or sought other
administrative use from the Landmarks Preservation Commission. The
Massachusetts court, distinguishing St. Paul & St. Andrew, focused on
the fact that the Jesuits had actually filed an application. The Boston
Landmark Ordinance, the court found, had much more of an impact on
the Jesuits than mere designation because, from 1986 to the present, the
Jesuits' efforts to run their church as they saw fit were repeatedly frus-
trated by the actions of the commission pursuant to the landmarks ordi-
nance. 128 The court found that the "mere fact the Jesuits honestly per-
ceived a restriction on this liturgically significant interior structure
tends to show the impact of the Landmark Statute on their religious
practices" (emphasis added). 129
The court found that the right to the free exercise of religion is not
absolute and given a compelling state interest the practice of religion
may be regulated. However, the court recognized that usually courts
uphold only regulations that "implicate public health or safety, since
only the gravest abuses endangering paramount interests, give occasion
for permissible limitation of free exercise rights. "'3o Finding that his-
toric preservation is a worthy goal, the court concluded that the state's
interest did not outweigh the significant restraints on the practice of the
Jesuits' religion. 31
This holding fails to address Supreme Court precedent such as Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Protective Ass'n., 2 a first amendment decision
where the Court held that three Indian tribes did not have a constitu-
tional right under the first amendment to block a federal road construc-
126. Slip op. at 8.
127. 67 N.Y.2d 510, 505 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1986).
128. Society of Jesus at 5-6.
129. Slip op. at 6-7.
130. Slip op. at 7.
131. Slip op. at 7-8.
132. 483 U.S. 439 (1988).
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tion project that would disrupt sacred religious grounds. The Court in
Lyng stated that even if the proposed road would virtually destroy the
Indians' ability to practice their religion, the Constitution does not pro-
vide a principle that could justify upholding respondents' legal
claims. 13  The Court reasoned that the affected individuals would not be
coerced by the Governments's action into violating their religious be-
liefs and the governmental action did not penalize religious activity .'4
In contrast, the court in Society of Jesus, focused on the Jesuits' activ-
ities rather than on their religious beliefs. Moreover, the court's reason-
ing that an individual's perception of an infringement on his or her reli-
gion seems to open the door to a subjective test on the infringement of
one's first amendment rights that could significantly inhibit local gov-
ernments from enacting any kind of regulation involving religious prop-
erties.
The federal court decision in St. Bartholomew's addresses challenges
by the church to the New York City Landmarks Ordinance based on
violations of rights under the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments of
the Constitution.
In 1967, the church building, the exterior of the community house,
and the surrounding property were designated as landmarks by the
Landmarks Preservation Commission. Subsequently, the church filed
three applications to demolish the community house and construct an
office building on the site, the last one based on a claim of insufficient
return.'35 Following public hearings where the commission heard testi-
mony concerning the suitability of the community house to its charitable
purpose, the extent and cost of necessary structural and mechanical re-
pairs for both the church and community and the state of the church's
finances, the commission voted to deny the church's application.
Thereafter, the church brought suit alleging that the landmark laws
are facially unconstitutional to the extent they impact the property of
any church because they (1) interfere with the free exercise of reli-
gion; (2) violate the equal protection clause because they treat charitable
and commercial institutions differently; (3) are unconstitutional as ap-
plied to St. Bartholomew's as a consequence of the commission's denial
of their applications for a certificate of appropriateness because that de-
nial interfered with the free exercise of religion and acted as a taking
without compensation; (4) violate the establishment clause by requir-
ing an intrusive examination of the church's internal affairs in the hard-
133. Id. at 1327.
134. Id. at 1325.
135. Slip op. at 6.
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ship application process; (5) violate the doctrine of substantive due
process by depriving the church of its property's reasonable income
production without a compelling state interest; (6) violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment because the legal standards for
designation of landmarks and for granting a certificate of appropriate-
ness are impermissibly vague; and (7) constitute due process viola-
tions because of the lack of the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses
in the certificate of appropriateness procedure.
The court rejected plaintiffs contention that the landmark laws un-
constitutionally interfered with the free exercise of the religious beliefs
of any church that is designated a landmark. The free exercise of reli-
gion is abridged when government action coerces the affected individ-
uals into violating their religious beliefs or it penalizes religious activity
by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privi-
leges enjoyed by other citizens. 136 The court added that a substantial in-
terference with the free exercise of religion may also occur where
church property is taken, even by condemnation, for state purposes.
The possibility that a church may at some future time seek to make a
different use of its landmarked property creates no more than an inci-
dental burden on the practice of religion and does not require the state to
justify its actions with heightened scrutiny of a compelling state interest.
In a footnote the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that whenever a
law has any impact upon a religious institution it must be justified by a
compelling state interest-a compelling state interest is only required
when the law impermissibly burdens the free exercise of religion. 37 The
court found that landmark designation does not in and of itself violate
the free exercise clause, especially since such designation does not de-
prive the church of the right to seek a certificate of appropriateness to
alter its property if the nature of the property is such that it no longer can
be used to carry out its religious or charitable mission.'38
The court did not accept the plaintiffs claim that the statutory and
judicial tests for economic hardship required an intrusive examination
into the finances and internal workings of the church resulting in an ex-
cessive entanglement between government and religion in violation of
the establishment clause. The doctrine of excessive entanglement nor-
mally applies in factual situations in which state aid to religious institu-
tions requires extensive and continuous monitoring of church activities
to ensure that the funds are being used solely for secular purposes.
136. Slip op. at 9.
137. Slip op. at 10.
138. Id.
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Here, according to the court, the doctrine is not applicable where the
government must make an inquiry into church finances for the limited
purpose of determining the validity the church's claim of economic
hardship. '39
The court held a trial on the plaintiff's claims that the landmarks law
was unconstitutional as applied to the Church. Noting that these claims
could be divided into takings arguments and first amendment argu-
ments, the court found no merit in either. The plaintiff's claim of uncon-
stitutionality as applied depends upon plaintiffs ability to prove that it
can no longer carry out its religious mission and charitable purpose in its
existing facilities because those facilities are inadequate and because it
cannot afford to spend the money necessary to make those facilities ade-
quate.'40
Although the concept of legitimate investment expectation is not di-
rectly transferable to a charitable or religious institution, the court
found that the concepts of reasonable beneficial use and the owner's pri-
mary expectations are equally applicable to both. The district court, rec-
ognizing the constitutionally acceptable standard for determining when
there has been a taking of charitable property developed by the New
York courts, found that where the landmark designation would prevent
or seriously interfere with the carrying out of the charitable purpose of
the institution it violates plaintiffs fifth amendment rights. 14' The court
concluded that it should apply the same inquiry to the first amendment
claim. Plaintiff had to prove that it can no longer carry out its charitable
work, i.e., exercise of religion, in its existing facilities to sustain its free
exercise claim.
The court examined the record before the commission in an effort to
determine if the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
it can no longer carry out its charitable purpose in its existing facilities
and found that it had failed to do so. The court summarized by finding
that the church failed to show that it cannot afford to pay for the cost of
necessary repairs to the church and the community house. Nor did the
church show that its financial situation precluded it from restoring its
property and carrying out its religious mission and charitable purpose.
The court held that as a matter of fact, the church failed to prove that its
community house is inadequate for the purposes to which it is devoted,
that the church failed to prove that it is incapable of carrying out its char-
itable purpose within those facilities, and that although those facilities
139. Slip op. at 11.
140. Slip op. at 16.
141. Slip op. at 18.
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do require some repair and rehabilitation, the church failed to show that
it cannot afford to pay for those necessary repairs and rehabilitation.42
V. Historic Preservation and Architectural
Control Law 43
A. Introduction
There were some other significant developments in 1989-90 in the
field of historic preservation and architectural control law in addition to
the cases involving preservation of historic churches. Two tax court de-
cisions concerning the valuation of preservation easements illustrate
that the courts continue to accept the assertion that preservation ease-
ments are a significant additional encumbrance on property even when
the property is already protected by existing local preservation controls.
As in the past year, most of the activity continues to be at the state and
local level. A number of legislatures enacted new laws requiring consid-
eration of the effect of state undertakings on historic resources. After
about three years of negotiation, the city of Atlanta passed a new his-
toric preservation ordinance that tailors the degree of protection to the
importance of the historic resource. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld
a state agency's prohibition of strip mining on a large portion of a site
because of the presence of archaeologically significant resources. In
Oregon, a state administrative board ruled that county provisions re-
quiring owner consent to identification of historic resources was in con-
travention of the purposes of statewide planning goals and prevented the
county from carrying out its balancing responsibility.
The most significant federal activity involves legislation aimed at the
increasingly significant issue of repatriation of Indian remains.
B. Developments in Federal Law
1. TAX CREDITS, TAX LAW, AND
PRESERVATION EASEMENTS
Rehabilitation projects taking advantage of the historic rehabilitation
tax credit in fiscal year 1989 were down 8.97 percent from 1,092 in fis-
cal year 1988 to 994 projects. Approximately one-half of all projects
were rehabilitated for housing. In fiscal year 1989 about 3,700 housing
142. Slip op. at 36-37.
143. This section is based on the annual report of the Historic Preservation and Ar-
chitectural Controls Subcommittee, Bradford J. White, Clarion Associates, Inc., Chi-
cago, and Lee Keatinge, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Golden, Colo-
rado.
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